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6 Attorneys for Plaintiff  
JAMES REYES  
7  
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9

10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
11 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE

12 JAMES REYES, an individual

13 Plaintiff,

14 vs.

15 IDYLLWILD FIRE PROTECTION  
16 DISTRICT, a Fire Protection District  
17 organized as a Township within the  
County of Riverside in the State of  
18 California, and DOES 1-10, inclusive,

19 Defendants  
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FILED  
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE

FEB 09 2015

M. Precjado

BY FAX

REC  
FEB 10 2015  
RCS

CASE NO. RIC 1501542

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FOR  
WRONGFUL TERMINATION OF  
EMPLOYMENT

[Cal. Labor Code, section 1102.5]

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

[Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, section 631]

1 Plaintiff James Reyes, for his Complaint of Wrongful Termination of Employment,  
2 alleges as follows, and demands a jury trial thereon:  
3

4 **PREFATORY**

5 1. This is an action by James Reyes, for wrongful termination of employment. On July 19,  
6 2014, Reyes was terminated from public employment as a Fire Captain for defendant, the  
7 Idyllwild Fire Protection District ("IFPD"). The termination was officially ascribed to  
8 misconduct charges arising from an emergency response incident on January 17, 2014. The  
9 termination will be shown to have been substantially motivated by a retaliatory animus,  
10 which renders the employer liable for damages.  
11

12 2. The termination was motivated in large part by retaliation for plaintiff's knowledge of  
13 improprieties within the Department that plaintiff reasonably believed, may constitute  
14 violations of statutes, regulations or other provisions of law of which Plaintiff was aware and  
15 brought to the attention of coworkers and IFPD board members. Such improprieties were  
16 the subject of testimony in a grand jury proceeding investigating suspected misconduct of the  
17 of the Fire Chief and Administrative Captain in violation of law. In the public findings of  
18 the grand jury such improprieties were documented and were the basis for the grand jury to  
19 publicly recommend an investigation and possible termination of the Fire Chief and  
20 Administrative Captain. Plaintiff's termination occurred shortly after the grand jury findings  
21 were made public. By this civil action, plaintiff will establish that his termination was  
22 substantially motivated by retaliation for reporting information about the employer  
23 concerning violations of law and that the termination was pretextual and imposed without  
24 just cause.

25 **PARTIES**

26 3. Plaintiff James Reyes is an individual residing in the State of California, and at times  
27 relevant was employed as a Fire Captain by the IFPD.

28 //

1 4. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon allege that at times relevant, defendant  
2 IFPD was a Fire Protection District organized as a Township or Special District or both,  
3 within the County of Riverside in the State of California, and was the employer of plaintiff  
4 James Reyes.

5  
6 5. Defendants DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, are not known or identified at this time.  
7 On information and belief, plaintiff alleges that each DOE is in some manner responsible for  
8 the wrongs alleged herein, in that each such defendant advised, encouraged, participated in,  
9 ratified, directed or conspired to do, the wrongful acts alleged herein. When the true names  
10 and capacities of said defendants become known, plaintiff will seek leave to amend this  
11 complaint to show their true identities in place of their fictitious names as DOES 1 through  
12 10. All reference to "defendants" herein shall include Does 1 through 10 unless the contrary  
13 expressly appears.

14  
15 6. Each defendant was the agent, principal, employee, employer, servant, master, partner,  
16 or joint venturer, of every other defendant. At all times relevant, defendants and each of  
17 them acted according to a common plan, scheme, understanding, agreement and conspiracy,  
18 under the authority of, and in the course and scope of, the aforesaid agency, service,  
19 employment, partnership, or other venture. Defendants, and each of them, planned, agreed,  
20 conspired to do, and acted in concert in doing, the wrongful acts alleged herein.

21  
22 7. Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing this action, including  
23 without limitation the filing of a claim for damages against the Idyllwild Fire Protection  
24 District, which was rejected by the Board of Commissioners on December 23, 2014.

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**STATEMENT OF FACTS**

8. Plaintiff James Reyes ("Plaintiff") was first employed by the Idyllwild Fire Protection District in 1989 and served continuously with the District until the termination on July 19, 2014 that is the subject of this action. Plaintiff had served with distinction for many years and had promoted to the rank of Fire Captain in 2003. Until December 2013, Plaintiff had always received standard or above standard performance evaluations.

9. After Reyes had served with distinction for many years and had attained the rank of Fire Captain, the appointment of Chief Patrick Reitz resulted in an atmosphere of rivalry, dissension and suspicion between certain groups of individual employees of the District.

10. As part of that atmosphere, Administrative Captain Mark LaMont, who was closely aligned with Chief Reitz, made false accusations that a Reserve Firefighter, Eric Gibby, placed a photograph on the internet or a social media site showing himself in a sexually graphic pose with an underage female wearing IFPD apparel. Reyes intervened with Lamont on Gibby's behalf, and stated to Lamont that the accusation against Reserve Firefighter Gibby was slanderous because it was false and that it was a violation of law and Department policies.

11. On January 17, 2014, plaintiff responded to a medical emergency as later described in the Notice of Termination. Plaintiff believed at all times, and believes at this time, that his handling of this emergency response was proper in all respects. Plaintiff asserts that the basis for the termination was pretextual and that the stated reasons for the termination are without merit or factual basis.

12. Plaintiff properly attended to the medical emergency and Plaintiff asserts that the basis for the termination was pretextual and that the stated reasons for the termination are without merit or factual basis.



1 13. On January 21, 2014, plaintiff was suddenly placed on Paid Administrative Leave based  
2 on four separate allegations of misconduct including the January 17, 2014 emergency  
3 incident. Because plaintiff knew his actions in all of the allegations was proper in all  
4 respects, plaintiff fully expected to be cleared of any wrongdoing or misconduct when the  
5 investigation was concluded. Prior to the grand jury report, Plaintiff was told by a coworker  
6 that his involvement in the January 17, 2014 incident would not result in a formal  
7 disciplinary action.

8  
9 14. On January 22, 2014, a citizen personnel complaint against Chief Reitz and Captain  
10 Lamont was submitted to the IFPD Board of Commissioners by the father, Tom Gibby, of  
11 Reserve Firefighter Eric Gibby, concerning the accusation against his son Eric Gibby, and  
12 other matters related to violations of law by Chief Reitz and Captain Lamont. This complaint  
13 detailed Plaintiff's involvement in the Gibby matter and threatened litigation against the  
14 IFPD in which Plaintiff was specifically named as the primary witness of Captain LaMont's  
15 wrongful acts including the slanderous statement.

16  
17 15. In response to Tom Gibby's personnel complaint, Chief Reitz told Gibby that he would  
18 conduct the internal investigation himself. Gibby informed Chief Reitz that his conducting  
19 of the investigation was not proper protocol as the Chief and his cohort Captain LaMont  
20 would be percipient witnesses. Plaintiff participated in the Department's internal  
21 investigation of the matters raised in Tom Gibby's personnel complaint against Captain  
22 LaMont and Department management officials were aware of plaintiff's participation in this  
23 matter. Plaintiff believes and herein alleges that no personnel action was taken against  
24 Captain LaMont by Chief Reitz despite Plaintiff's credible statements concerning Captain  
25 LaMont's slanderous actions.

26  
27 16. A grand jury investigation into possible conduct of the District in violation of statutes  
28 or regulations was initiated including the allegations contained in the Gibby complaint.

1 17. On February 22, 2014, Chief Reitz issued a memorandum to department personnel  
2 soliciting information about plaintiff along with soliciting information about members of the  
3 Gibby family.

4  
5 18. On April 3, 2014, plaintiff was subpoenaed to testify before a Riverside County Grand  
6 Jury on April 8, 2014. In response to the subpoena, plaintiff testified on April 8, 2014.

7  
8 19. In his Grand Jury testimony, plaintiff answered all questions truthfully to the best of his  
9 knowledge of the matters under investigation. Plaintiff identified other individuals, including  
10 mostly District employees, believed to have knowledge of the matters under investigation,  
11 and gave phone numbers of those individuals. Plaintiff is informed and believes and alleges  
12 thereon that individuals whose phone numbers he gave were later contacted by the same  
13 Grand Jury.

14  
15 20. On May 7, 2014, Chief Reitz issued a memorandum ordering all employees summoned  
16 to the Grand Jury to contact him before scheduling a grand jury appearance. On May 9,  
17 2014, plaintiff called Chief Reitz and told him he had already spoken to the Grand Jury.

18  
19 21. Chief Reitz told plaintiff he would not ask what plaintiff talked about, but asked plaintiff  
20 how long he was in there. Plaintiff replied "not too long." Chief Reitz stated "That is all I  
21 need to know."

22  
23 22. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at some time after his Grand  
24 Jury testimony and before his termination, Chief Reitz and other Department officials  
25 became aware of a statement made by the Riverside County Fire Chief, John Hawkins, to the  
26 effect that plaintiff has "dirt on everyone" in the Department.

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1 23. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Chief Reitz and Captain  
2 LaMont knew at all times that most if not all matters on which the Grand Jury would make  
3 findings adverse to their personal stake and institutional interest in the matters under  
4 investigation would necessarily be made largely in reliance on plaintiff's Grand Jury  
5 testimony. Defendants' knowledge was based on plaintiff's long experience with the  
6 Department, his comprehensive knowledge of the Department and the professional field, and  
7 his known alignment on the side of the Gibby brothers in their ongoing disputes with Chief  
8 Reitz and Captain Lamont.

9  
10 24. The Grand Jury report was publicly issued on or around June 19, 2014. The issuance of  
11 the Grand Jury report would have informed Chief Reitz and the Department, if they were not  
12 already aware, that Reyes had testified, and that his testimony was adverse to the personal  
13 interest and stake of Chief Reitz and Captain Lamont in the matters that the Grand Jury  
14 investigated. A true and correct copy of the report is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

15  
16 25. The grand jury report, on page 3, paragraph 2, refers to the matter of Captain Lamont's  
17 accusation against Eric Gibby, in terms that relate specifically to the testimony that  
18 defendants knew plaintiff would have given to the Grand Jury. Among other features of this  
19 section of the report, the Grand Jury report uses the term "slanderous comments" in  
20 describing Captain Lamont's accusations, after plaintiff himself had used that exact term in  
21 speaking about the matter to Captain Lamont. Plaintiff's identification as the primary  
22 witness in the Gibby complaint, as detailed in paragraph 14 hereinabove, and his  
23 participation in the internal investigation, as detailed in paragraph 15 hereinabove, gave  
24 department management notice that plaintiff was largely responsible for the testimony  
25 supporting the grand jury's findings on page 3, paragraph 2. Therefore, defendants knew  
26 from their receipt of the Grand Jury report that plaintiff's testimony had been instrumental  
27 in the grand jury reaching this finding.

28



1 26. Defendants also knew from their receipt of the grand jury report, that plaintiff was  
2 instrumental in the grand jury reaching the finding stated on page 3, paragraph 3. Plaintiff  
3 was informed of the October 8, 2012 accident on or around September or October 2013, and  
4 informed an IFPD Board member of the situation. Plaintiff's testimony and identification  
5 of witnesses concerning this matter was readily traceable to him from the perspective of  
6 department management at the time that plaintiff was terminated.

7  
8 27. The finding in the grand jury report, on page 4, paragraph 2, was also traceable to  
9 plaintiff's probable testimony from the perspective of department management, as plaintiff  
10 was familiar with this allegation of forgery from the outset, and reasonably believed this to  
11 be a violation of law in giving his grand jury testimony. Defendants also knew from their  
12 receipt of the grand jury report that plaintiff was instrumental in the grand jury reaching this  
13 finding.

14  
15 28. The grand jury report, on page 5, in the item numbered 2, makes a finding of  
16 nonfeasance on the part of the Fire Chief. Defendants knew from their receipt of the grand  
17 jury report that plaintiff was likely instrumental in the grand jury reaching this finding against  
18 the Fire Chief.

19  
20 29. After Chief Reitz became aware of plaintiff's Grand Jury testimony, he and the  
21 Department embarked on a course of retaliation by artificially magnifying the ongoing  
22 investigation of the January 17, 2014 medical emergency into a pretext for termination.

23  
24 30. On July 19, 2014, approximately one month after the Grand Jury published its report,  
25 plaintiff was terminated from his employment by means of a "Notice of Termination" signed  
26 by Chief Reitz. A true and correct copy of the Notice of Termination is attached hereto as  
27 Exhibit B.

28 //



1 31. The allegations in the "Notice of Termination" are a pretext for an action substantially  
2 motivated by retaliation for plaintiff's Grand Jury testimony. In part, the allegations are  
3 false, or exaggerated, and do not state grounds that ordinarily could or would lead to  
4 termination of an experienced Fire Captain such as plaintiff.

5  
6 32. The pretextual nature of the allegations in the "Notice of Termination" is revealed in the  
7 facts of the alleged incident, in that the course of action prescribed would have plaintiff  
8 interrupt a life-saving procedure. The misconduct charges in the termination notice do not  
9 disclose the outcome to the patient, or charge that the patient's outcome was in any way  
10 adversely impacted by any act or omission of Reyes.

11  
12 33. The pretextual nature of the allegations in the "Notice of Termination" is revealed by  
13 the recitation of considerations bearing on the penalty, in its reliance on items (2) and (3)  
14 therein as grounds to aggravate the penalty for the charged misconduct in the medical  
15 emergency. The second item cited in the penalty consideration referred to a "Documented  
16 Verbal Counseling" on March 11, 2013. The third item cited performance evaluation for the  
17 period ended December 5, 2013. Careful examination of the facts underlying these prior  
18 incidents in the course of plaintiff's impending administrative appeal will reveal that the  
19 District's reliance on these prior matters to aggravate the penalty is a frivolous and pretextual  
20 tactic, in part because the Grand Jury investigation was already under way at the time of the  
21 evaluation.

22  
23 34 The prior records on which the District relied to aggravate the penalty will be shown to  
24 be a product of the internal rivalry and dissension resulting from the appointment of Chief  
25 Reitz. After Chief Reitz arrived at the Department, Reyes began to receive negative  
26 personnel evaluations. The negative comments in Reyes' evaluations tend to be found only  
27 in the most subjective aspects of the evaluations, such as attitude, demeanor, and manner of  
28 interacting with co-workers and the public. The subjectivity of these subjects of performance

1 review enabled the Department to create a paper record falsely portraying Reyes as an  
2 employee who does not care about his job or the people he works with and serves on the job,  
3 while Reyes' performance and evaluations on the objectively verifiable aspects of his  
4 employment remained strong. Neither the past criticism, nor any misconduct that may be  
5 found in the medical emergency, would have resulted in termination if not for plaintiff's  
6 Grand Jury testimony.

7

8 35. The wrongful termination imposed upon plaintiff, proximately caused damages in the  
9 form of loss of past, present and future income and benefits from employment, loss of future  
10 earning capacity, expenses of conducting a job search, other consequential and incidental  
11 damages, emotional distress, and attorney fees incurred in the effort to secure and vindicate  
12 the rights violated by defendants, including the filing and prosecution of this action. Under  
13 Labor Code, section 1102.5, and Civil Code, section 3333, defendants and each of them are  
14 liable to plaintiff in compensatory damages for all losses proximately caused by its unlawful  
15 employment discrimination.

16

17 36. Plaintiff has filed an administrative appeal from the termination which will be heard by  
18 the California Office of Administrative Hearings. In his administrative appeal, plaintiff  
19 expects to establish that the charge of neglect of duty in the medical emergency is frivolous,  
20 that the termination is an excessive penalty, and that plaintiff must be reinstated with back  
21 pay. Plaintiff will then bring his retaliation claim to trial to recover the additional damages  
22 caused by a wrongful termination in retaliation for reporting suspected violations of law to  
23 a Grand Jury.

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**FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**

**(Damages against all defendants for retaliation under Labor Code, section  
1102.5(b))**

37. As pertinent herein, California Labor Code, section 1102.5(b), provides that “An employer may not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or regulation.” *Labor Code*, section 1102.5(e) provides that a government employee’s report to his or her employer constitutes a “disclosure of information” within the meaning of section 1102.5(b). *Labor Code*, section 1102.5 sets forth a fundamental public policy against taking adverse employment actions against employees in retaliation for disclosing information to a government agency that the employee has reasonable cause to believe discloses a violation of a state or federal statute.

38. On April 8, 2014, plaintiff testified before a grand jury of the State of California, County of Riverside, pursuant to subpoena, and disclosed information reasonably believed to constitute violation of statute, regulation or other provision of law.

39. Shortly after plaintiff testified before the grand jury, defendants became aware of the fact that plaintiff had so testified, and later, became aware of the substance of plaintiff’s testimony and of the fact that it was adverse to their personal and departmental interests, and disclosed suspected violations of law by the defendants.

40. In retaliation for plaintiff’s protected activity in disclosing suspected violation of law to a Grand Jury, defendants took adverse employment action against plaintiff on July 19, 2014, terminating plaintiff’s employment, based on a pretext of false and frivolous



1 allegations of misconduct on past occasions including without limitation the January 17.  
2 2014 medical emergency.

3  
4 41. By instituting and prosecuting false and unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct  
5 against plaintiff and taking the aforementioned adverse employment actions against  
6 plaintiff, defendants wrongfully retaliated against plaintiff in response to the protected  
7 activity of testifying before a Grand Jury and disclosing suspected violation of law

8  
9 42. Alternatively, plaintiff's protected activity in testifying before the Grand Jury and  
10 disclosing suspected violation of law constituted a substantial and motivating factor in  
11 causing defendants and each of them to make the decision to terminate plaintiff's  
12 employment on the pretext of false and frivolous allegations of misconduct.

13  
14 43. The wrongful and retaliatory termination of plaintiff's employment caused plaintiff  
15 economic and general damages, consisting of lost wages, lost opportunities to earn  
16 overtime, lost fringe benefits, loss of future earning capacity; past, present and future  
17 emotional distress, anxiety, stress, humiliation, mortification, embarrassment,  
18 disappointment and disillusionment, physical illness and disease, insomnia, headaches,  
19 pain and suffering, and other highly unpleasant mental and psychic manifestations to be  
20 proven at trial.

21  
22 44. Defendants and each of them are liable to plaintiff in compensatory special and  
23 general damages because of their unlawful retaliation for plaintiff's protected activity of  
24 testifying before a Grand Jury and disclosing suspected violation of law.

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**DEMAND FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, plaintiff James Reyes demands that judgment be entered in favor and against defendants as follows:

1. For compensatory special damages including lost wages, lost fringe benefits, and prejudgment interest at the legal rate thereon, according to proof, in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limit of this court;
2. For compensatory general damages according to proof in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court, including without limitation damages for emotional distress, physical pain, injury, anguish, anxiety, stress and suffering; and
3. For an award of attorney fees to the extent authorized by law including without limitation Code of Civil Procedure, section 1021.5; and
4. For costs of suit incurred herein, as allowed by law; and
5. For such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.

Dated: February 5, 2015

**LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN J. HORVATH**

By:   
STEPHEN J. HORVATH  
Attorney for Plaintiff  
James Reyes


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**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Under Code of Civil Procedure, section 631, plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial for all claims herein upon which a right of jury trial exists.

Dated: February 5, 2015

**LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN J. HORVATH**

By:   
STEPHEN J. HORVATH  
Attorney for Plaintiff  
James Reyes

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VERIFICATION

I, JAMES REYES, am the (Plaintiff) in the above-entitled action; that I have read the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT, and know the contents thereof; that the same is true of my own knowledge, except as to the matters which are therein stated on my information or belief and as to those matters that I believe to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 22 day of January, 2015, in PASADENA, California.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
JAMES REYES

ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address) <b>STEPHEN J. HORVATH, SBN: 212502</b> LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN J. HORVATH 1070 EAST GREEN STREET, SUITE 201 PASADENA, CA 91106 TELEPHONE NO.: (626) 795-2094 FAX NO (626) 795-2095 ATTORNEY FOR (Name): <b>JAMES REYES</b>	FOR COURT USE ONLY
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF <b>RIVERSIDE</b> STREET ADDRESS: <b>4050 MAIN STREET</b> MAILING ADDRESS: <b>SAME</b> CITY AND ZIP CODE: <b>RIVERSIDE, CA 92501</b> BRANCH NAME: <b>RIVERSIDE HISTORIC COURTHOUSE</b>	
CASE NAME: <b>James Reyes v. Idyllwild Fire Protection Dist.; and Docs 1-10, inclusive</b>	
<b>CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Unlimited</b> (Amount demanded exceeds \$25,000) <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Limited</b> (Amount demanded is \$25,000 or less)	<b>Complex Case Designation</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Counter</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Joinder</b> Filed with first appearance by defendant (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.402)
CASE NUMBER: <b>RIC 1501542</b> JUDGE: DEPT:	


Items 1-6 below must be completed (see instructions on page 2).

1. Check one box below for the case type that best describes this case:

<b>Auto Tort</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Auto (22) <input type="checkbox"/> Uninsured motorist (46) <b>Other PI/DPD/WD (Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Asbestos (04) <input type="checkbox"/> Product liability (24) <input type="checkbox"/> Medical malpractice (45) <input type="checkbox"/> Other PI/DPD/WD (23) <b>Non-PI/DPD/WD (Other) Tort</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Business tort/unfair business practice (07) <input type="checkbox"/> Civil rights (08) <input type="checkbox"/> Defamation (13) <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud (16) <input type="checkbox"/> Intellectual property (19) <input type="checkbox"/> Professional negligence (25) <input type="checkbox"/> Other non-PI/DPD/WD tort (35) <b>Employment</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Wrongful termination (36) <input type="checkbox"/> Other employment (15)	<b>Contract</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Breach of contract/warranty (06) <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 3.740 collections (09) <input type="checkbox"/> Other collections (09) <input type="checkbox"/> Insurance coverage (18) <input type="checkbox"/> Other contract (37) <b>Real Property</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Eminent domain/Inverse condemnation (14) <input type="checkbox"/> Wrongful eviction (33) <input type="checkbox"/> Other real property (26) <b>Unlawful Detainer</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Commercial (31) <input type="checkbox"/> Residential (32) <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs (38) <b>Judicial Review</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Asset forfeiture (05) <input type="checkbox"/> Petition re: arbitration award (11) <input type="checkbox"/> Writ of mandate (02) <input type="checkbox"/> Other judicial review (39)	<b>Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.400-3.403)</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Antitrust/Trade regulation (03) <input type="checkbox"/> Construction defect (10) <input type="checkbox"/> Mass tort (40) <input type="checkbox"/> Securities litigation (28) <input type="checkbox"/> Environmental/Toxic tort (30) <input type="checkbox"/> Insurance coverage claims arising from the above listed provisionally complex case types (41) <b>Enforcement of Judgment</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Enforcement of judgment (20) <b>Miscellaneous Civil Complaint</b> <input type="checkbox"/> RICO (27) <input type="checkbox"/> Other complaint (not specified above) (42) <b>Miscellaneous Civil Petition</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Partnership and corporate governance (21) <input type="checkbox"/> Other petition (not specified above) (43)
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2. This case  is  is not complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court. If the case is complex, mark the factors requiring exceptional judicial management:
- |                                                                                                                                |                                                                                                                                                            |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| a. <input type="checkbox"/> Large number of separately represented parties                                                     | d. <input type="checkbox"/> Large number of witnesses                                                                                                      |
| b. <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive motion practice raising difficult or novel issues that will be time-consuming to resolve | e. <input type="checkbox"/> Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court |
| c. <input type="checkbox"/> Substantial amount of documentary evidence                                                         | f. <input type="checkbox"/> Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision                                                                                  |
3. Remedies sought (check all that apply): a.  monetary    b.  nonmonetary; declaratory or injunctive relief    c.  punitive
4. Number of causes of action (specify): **2; First-Discrimination, Second-Retaliation**
5. This case  is  is not a class action suit.
6. If there are any known related cases, file and serve a notice of related case. (You may use form CM-015.)

Date: February 5, 2015  
**STEPHEN J. HORVATH**  
 (TYPE OR PRINT NAME)

  
 (SIGNATURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY FOR PARTY)

**NOTICE**

- Plaintiff must file this cover sheet with the first paper filed in the action or proceeding (except small claims cases or cases filed under the Probate Code, Family Code, or Welfare and Institutions Code). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.220.) Failure to file may result in sanctions.
- File this cover sheet in addition to any cover sheet required by local court rule.
- If this case is complex under rule 3.400 et seq. of the California Rules of Court, you must serve a copy of this cover sheet on all other parties to the action or proceeding.
- Unless this is a collections case under rule 3.740 or a complex case, this cover sheet will be used for statistical purposes only.

BY FAX



SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE  
4050 Main Street  
Riverside, CA 92501  
[www.riverside.courts.ca.gov](http://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov)

NOTICE OF DEPARTMENT ASSIGNMENT  
AND CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE (CRC 3.722)

REYES VS IDYLLWILD FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT

CASE NO. RIC1501542

This case is assigned to the Honorable Judge John W Vineyard in Department 07 for all purposes.

The Case Management Conference is scheduled for 08/10/15 at 8:30 in  
Department 07.

The plaintiff/cross-complainant shall serve a copy of this notice on all defendants/cross-defendants who  
are named or added to the complaint and file proof of service.

Any disqualification pursuant to CCP section 170.6 shall be filed in accordance with that section.

Requests for accommodations can be made by submitting Judicial Council form MC-410 no fewer than  
five court days before the hearing. See California Rules of Court, rule 1.100.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that I am currently employed by the Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, and that I  
am not a party to this action or proceeding. In my capacity, I am familiar with the practices and  
procedures used in connection with the mailing of correspondence. Such correspondence is deposited  
in the outgoing mail of the Superior Court. Outgoing mail is delivered to and mailed by the United States  
Postal Service, postage prepaid, the same day in the ordinary course of business. I certify that I served  
a copy of the foregoing NOTICE on this date, by depositing said copy as stated above.

Court Executive Officer/Clerk

Date: 02/09/15

by: \_\_\_\_\_

MARIA M PRECIADO Deputy Clerk